An Overview of the Origins of America’s Catch and Release Immigration Policies–The Causes and Costs of Illegal Immigration Through the United States’ Southwest Border (Part IV)

A Report by Dr. Peter Navarro. Released February 2020.

Thus far in this report, we have demonstrated that illegal mass migration is at recent high records among America’s southern border. This surge is primarily populated by illegal aliens from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and secondarily populated by Mexican illegal aliens. Due the current rate of traffic, more than one million new illegal aliens crossed the border in FY19.

The next question this report seeks to answer is this: Why was it so easy for so many illegal aliens to quickly take up residency in the United States, even after being apprehended by CBP agents? The answer lies in a set of legislative acts, judicial decisions, and other policies and practices that collectively have encouraged south-to-north migration patterns while institutionalizing an immigration policy known as “catch and release.”

Catch and release refers to the inability of U.S. government officials to detain the vast majority of illegal immigrants apprehended at the border for more than a short period of time – after which they are released into the interior of the United States to await disposition of their claims to remain in the U.S.(126)

            A. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act
Prior to passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, much of the immigration to the U.S. flowed east-to-west from the Eurasia land mass under a national origin quota system. The 1965 Act not only ended national origin immigration quotas; it created visa preferences for family reunification.  Over time, these changes in immigration law would institutionalize patterns of “chain migration” from countries south of the U.S. border.(127)

Chain migration refers to the practice of issuing visas based not on merit-centered factors such as education level and job skills. Rather, once an illegal alien gets a green card or becomes a legal resident, that alien can sponsor their spouse and/or their children. In addition, once a migrant becomes a citizen, he or she can further petition to bring over their parents, married children and/or adult brothers and sisters.(128)  By establishing visa preferences for individuals seeking family reunification, the 1965 Act helped move America’s immigration system away from a merit-based approach and catalyzed “chain migration.”(129) According to the Department of Homeland Security, over half of all lawful permanent immigration to the U.S. over the past decade has been family-based. In 2017, that number reached nearly 70% of all visas granted.(130)
 
Table Ten illustrates the rise of family-based chain migration since passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act.    In 1965, only 15% of total visas was family-based.  By 1970, that number had risen to 46%.   In 2017, family-based immigration was almost 70% of the visa total.

              B. The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement
The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA) sowed one of the single most important seeds of today’s set of catch and release immigration policies. It established a time limit on how long unaccompanied alien minors (UAC) can be detained.(132)

The FSA was the result of a class action suit filed in 1985 by plaintiff Jenny L. Flores and other class members. They sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) over its treatment of detained illegal alien minors.(133)

In the 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement, the Clinton Administration’s INS Commissioner, Doris Meissner, agreed to have unaccompanied alien minors apprehended at the border released “without unnecessary delay.”(134) This vague clause put an expiration date on how long UAC could be held before being released into the interior of the United States.

The FSA also mandated that UACs must be released to a parent, a legal guardian, an adult relative, an adult individual designated by the parents/guardians, a licensed program willing to accept legal custody, or an adult individual or entity seeking custody.(135) In most cases, any one of these individuals are illegal aliens themselves. This clause thereby further incentivized adult illegal aliens to traffic their own children to the U.S. even as it helped fuel the smuggling industry.(136)

Between February 2014 and September 2015, Customs and Border Protection estimates that nearly 80% of all released UAC were sponsored by an illegal alien, and an additional 700 were sponsored by those going through deportation hearings.(137)

            C. 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act
In 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)(138) as a well-intentioned piece of legislation designed to fight human trafficking — primarily sex trafficking — from places like Russia and Eastern Europe.(139) Among its many provisions, TVPA made foreign victims eligible for federally funded or administered health benefits and other services, regardless of immigration status.(140)

The 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)(141) created new measures within the 2000 TVPA that required CBP/DHS to send unaccompanied illegal alien minors found crossing the border from noncontiguous countries (countries with which the U.S. does not share a border) to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for processing.(142)  This seemingly-sensisble reform compelled significant unintended consequences.

Prior to the 2008 TVPRA, illegal alien minors deemed inadmissible to the U.S. could be immediately repatriated back to their home country. While the 2008 Act preserved the right of CBP/DHS to quickly repatriate Mexican and Canadian nationals deemed inadmissible, it explicitly prevented such repatriation of minors from noncontiguous countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.(143) 

  • In combination with the 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement, the 2008 TVPRA thus created a situation in which non-Mexican UAC from south of the border (1) could not be repatriated, (2) had to be processed for a court hearing, and (3) had to be quickly released into the interior of the U.S., often to illegal alien relatives or parents.

In this way, a piece of legislation originally designed to protect children primarily from Eastern European sex trafficking rings was inadvertently extended to the protection of illegal alien minors being smuggled across America’s southern border. The perverse result incentivizes more child smuggling.

As a further perverse outcome, the placement of UAC with “sponsored guardians” has made many of these minors susceptible to gang recruitment. A random check conducted in the summer of 2017 found that 30% of all UAC had known or suspected gang ties. Many of teens were affiliated with the dangerous MS-13 transnational gang with roots in Central America.

Due to the language of the TVPRA, even if CBP is confident that a minor crossing the border has ties to a dangerous criminal organization, CBP can do nothing but send them on to Health and Human Services. Eventually they will be released, typically to an illegal alien adult, while pending a court hearing.(144)

         D. Importance of 2015 Judge Dolly Gee Decision
In 2015, one of the most significant catch and release rules was formulated when the Obama-appointed judge, Dolly Gee, defined “unnecessary delay” as stated in the Flores Settlement Agreement to be no more than 20 days. Of equal import, Gee expanded the coverage of the FSA from unaccompanied children to all children—accompanied or unaccompanied.(145)  

With this exceedingly expansive interpretation of the FSA, Gee presented the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the following Catch 22 choice.  Either:

  • DHS can keep the family unit intact; but if it does, DHS must release not just the child but the entire family unit within 20 days; OR
  • DHS can separate the child from his or her family and still treat the adults in a way that might lead to a more immediate possible return of these adult illegal aliens.

Given that the second option entails a political firestorm over “family separation,”(146) DHS has frequently opted for the first option, releasing the entire family unit.(147) The problem with this option, however, is that it leads to the following perverse incentives:

  • Single adults are incentivized to travel with children, regardless of whether they are actually a family, to ensure the best opportunity of being released into the United States’ interior. This process puts more children at risk.
  • Single adults are incentivized to use children that are not their own to game the system. According to a recent survey by the Department of Homeland Security, as many as 15% of the children now traveling with illegal alien adults are unrelated to the alleged parents transporting them.148 This inducement endangers more children.

Figure Five illustrates the sharp shift of migratory patterns of single adults versus family units after the 2015 Judge Dolly Gee decision.

Note the sharp upward trend in the number of family units as a percentage of the three main groups crossing the border following the Gee decision. In 2015, family units accounted for just over 10% of the traffic. Today, family units top 50% while the single adult category has fallen from over 90% to less than 40 percent.(149)

Figure Five: Illegal Immigration by Single Adults, UAC, and Family Units

         E. Other Legislative and Judicial Actions Impacting Illegal Immigration
The passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) in 1994 stripped away Mexico’s protective tariffs on corn, flooding the country with cheaper American corn and driving millions of Mexican peasant farmers out of business.(151) One study notes that annual Mexican immigration increased by over 100,000 per year from the early 1990s to 2007, (152) estimating that 80-85% of the increase was illegal immigration.(153)

As an additional spur to illegal immigration, NAFTA also led to the rapid development of “maquiladoras.” These are factories in Mexico typically near the border that are run by foreign companies seeking to export products.(154) This high concentration of new, more efficient maquiladora industries led to the elimination of an estimated 28,000 Mexican small businesses. It resulted in more northward migration with similar network effects.(155)

The 2001 Supreme Court Decision of Zadvydas v. Davis(156) forced Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to release illegal aliens from a large number of countries that consistently refuse to repatriate their citizens. These countries include most notably Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, China, India, Jamaica, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Poland, Nigeria, and a number of former Soviet Republics.(157)

        V. The Trump Administration’s Response to Illegal Immigration
Now that a thorough assessment of the scope, costs, and causes of the illegal immigration crisis has been conducted, an examination of President Trump’s decisive and innovative actions reveals Trump’s prioritization of America’s safety and prosperity.

President Trump brought long overdue reform to American immigration policy, enabling the nation to finally enjoy the protection and prosperity that strong and secure borders provide. Through a series of executive actions, agency-level changes, and even international cooperation, the massive inflow of illegal aliens had been substantially curtailed as President Trump introduced novel and innovative improvements to protect American citizens. 

Trump’s four pillars for immigration reform were introduced in his first State of the Union address: (1) increased border security and funding; (2) ending the diversity visa lottery; (3) restrictions on family-based immigration; and (4) a path to citizenship for DREAMers.

Presidential Actions
Within his first week in office, President Trump introduced an executive order reprioritizing the removal of illegal aliens who have been convicted of any criminal offense.(158) Previous administrations had permitted lawlessness and criminal behavior of any level committed by illegal aliens, excluding serious crimes.  This essential pivot marked a new day in immigration policy and the security of the United States. 

Wasting no time, the Buy American, Hire American Executive Order was issued months later, ending the federal government’s neglect of American workers for cheaper, temporary foreign labor.  Within a year, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services embarked upon sweeping actions to protect U.S. workers and their wages. The Trump administration also increased transparency and fraud detection efforts in employment-based visa programs.(159)

Also responding to the President’s EO, the Justice Department launched the Protecting U.S. Workers Initiative to target, investigate, and hold accountable companies that intentionally discriminate against American workers in favor of cheaper foreign labor via temporary visa programs.(160) As of March 2020, the Initiative had reached settlements with eight different companies found illegally prioritizing temporary visa workers over Americans and garnered over $1.2 million in penalties and back pay to affected U.S. workers.(161)

Most notable, however, is the President’s commitment to build a wall along the Southern Border to finally end the rampant and unrestrained border crossing of millions of illegal aliens. In February 2019, the problem worsened so dramatically that the President declared a National Emergency to secure $8 billion in funding, the first time since 9/11 that an emergency declaration authorized military action.(162) By the end of 2020, more than 450 additional miles of the U.S.-Mexico border wall were completed. To expedite the mission, 4,000 National Guard personnel were sent to the Southern Border to support federal border security and wall construction efforts.(163)  

To enhance domestic screening and vetting requirements of foreign nationals desiring to enter the United States, the President created the National Vetting Center.(164) By creating an information-sharing apparatus, the Department of Homeland Security was finally able to automatically check the names of foreigners seeking to enter the U.S. with other intelligence agencies and highly classified databases. These higher levels of interagency cooperation enabled unprecedented levels of coordination and information sharing to assist our law enforcement officers and other federal government workers in securing our borders.  

President Trump also lowered the unnecessarily high ceiling for refugee admissions as many of the extenuating conflicts that justified these levels have been sufficiently resolved. Since 2016, this admissions ceiling had been reduced by over 75% (84, 994 in FY16; 18,000 in FY20), eliminating the program’s rampant abuse. 

Many who come to the U.S., whether as refugees or legal aliens, remain in the country beyond the allotted time and can live in America unnoticed for years or even decades, leeching benefits from citizen welfare programs without ever contributing to them. Recognizing this grim reality, President Trump restricted visa access to foreign nationals from countries with high visa overstay rates in order to prevent future overstays.(165)

As of March 2019, 415,000 foreign nationals were estimated to be living in the United States beyond their nonimmigrant visa time allotment.  Scofflaws from twenty nations exhibit overstay rates exceeding ten percent and some countries have rates of up to 30, or even 40 percent.(166) This unrestrained exploitation of the generosity and good will of the United States was finally curtailed under the Trump Administration.

In May 2019, President Trump issued a Memorandum on Enforcing the Legal Responsibilities of Sponsors of Aliens. In doing so, the President ordered the enforcement of financial commitments of immigrant sponsors who pledge to reimburse the government should the immigrants they sponsor receive public benefits.

The global pandemic necessitated additional reform in immigration policy to protect the American people.  As the CCP Virus spread, restricting travel became an expedient, essential move.  
To secure our borders from the CCP Virus, President Trump swiftly banned non-citizens traveling from China and shortly thereafter terminated entry of persons from 31 countries, including travel restrictions with Mexico and Canada. President Trump also terminated new immigrant and nonimmigrant work visas through the year 2020 in order to prioritize American workers in the recovering job market, creating an estimated 525,000 jobs(167) for Americans.(168) 

In March 2020, on grounds of public health, the Centers for Disease Control invoked Section 362 of the Public Health Service Act, temporarily terminating the introduction of persons or goods into the United States.(169) This move suspended asylum claims at the Southern Border.

The President also signed an executive order in April of 2020 temporarily suspending the approval of green cards, particularly green card holders sponsoring their extended families for permanent US residency, also known as chain migration.(170) Additionally, the Diversity Visa Lottery was suspended. Looking to ameliorate potential future impacts of illegal immigration, the President has eliminated illegal aliens for apportionment purposes in the 2020 Census.(171) This move alone prevented an estimated 14.3 million illegal aliens from skewing apportionment intended to be based on U.S. citizens.(172)

As evidenced, President Trump dynamically and effectively exercised the powers available to him to reform immigration policy and to protect the United States. Illegal aliens hiding in the United States were being removed en masse.  Under President Trump, the once steady stream of illegal migration was largely curtailed. While using the full measure of his executive power, President Trump also directed various agencies and departments to respond in their jurisdictions to curb the pervasive and pernicious threat of illegal immigration.  

             A. Agency Authority and Policy Changes
At the direction of the President, myriad agencies adjusted protocols, procedures, and policies to curb the entry of illegal aliens into the United States. An assortment of major policy changes is detailed below.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
Migrants from countries that have experienced severe conflict, natural disasters, or other forms of extenuating unrest may be designated with temporary protected status (TPS). Initially, Congress established this legal status in 1990 to provide asylum for Salvadorans impacted by their civil war. The designation permits TPS individuals to reside in the U.S. for up to 18 months and can be renewed as seen fit. From 2017 to 2019, TPS designation terminated for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nepal as conflicts and protracted unrest in these areas have been sufficiently resolved for the safe return of their citizens. Former TPS designees then receive 12-18 months to plan for their repatriation. 

Prompt Asylum Care Review (PACR) and Humanitarian Asylum Review Program (HARP)
These two novel programs aimed to alleviate and expedite the immense backlog of asylum cases that were formerly under the exclusive competency of ICE, but now receive CBP support. Humanitarian claims were adjudicated more efficiently and humanely as those who do not meet the standards were removed swiftly, within ten days.

Transit-Country Asylum Ban
More commonly known as third-country agreements, transit-country asylum bans reduced fraudulent claims of asylum, nearly cutting the approved rates in half from 80% to 45% from June to December 2019.(173) A migrant crossing through a third country en route to the U.S.-Mexico border who fails to show evidence of a denied asylum application in at least one of these third countries was no longer eligible to receive asylum in the United States. 

Narrowed Asylum Criteria
To be granted asylum, an individual must demonstrate that they have suffered or have well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, nationality, political opinion, and/or membership in a particular social group. In August of 2014, in the Matter of A-R-C-G, the Justice Department’s Board of Immigration Appeals significantly expanded the meaning of “membership in a particular social group” to “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” and who are victims of domestic abuse.(174) With this ruling the Board further opened the door to dubious asylum claims. Anyone making such a claim were previously released into the interior of the U.S. while awaiting adjudication of the matter.

 

Former Attorney General Sessions overruled this decision in 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018),175 eliminating gang or domestic violence from qualifying as “membership in a particular social group.” However, this reform was stymied by a permanent injunction on December 19, 2018, by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in Grace v. Whitaker.(176)

Public Charge Rule
Implemented by USCIS in February 2020, the public charge rule restricts admission to any immigrant who will become a net burden to the taxpayer.(177)  Unlike many other Administration actions, the public charge rule has existed in immigration law in various forms for over 100 years. 

To determine if a migrant may become a net burden, various factors are evaluated, including age, health, family status, education, skills, assets, and ability to speak English. Generally speaking, this litmus test means individuals applying for visas must have a healthy income above the Federal Poverty Guideline, a good credit score, health insurance, have employment or recent employment, a minimum of a high school education or verified occupational skills, good health, no medical issues, and the ability to speak English. This policy ensures that the hard-earned tax dollars of American citizens are protected and that those entering our country to work or eventually become citizens will contribute just as every other American does.

Migrant Protection Protocols
In January 2019, migrant protection protocols were implemented allowing CBP to return migrants to Mexico to await their U.S. immigration court hearings and final adjudication. Previously, migrants were admitted into the U.S. and would enjoy lengthy waiting periods before their cases were heard, taking advantage of welfare programs in the meantime or never appearing for their hearings whatsoever, instead illegally hiding in the United States.  

Fraudulent Families Initiative
ICE began the Fraudulent Families Initiative to identify migrants attempting to illegally obtain entry into the country with children they claim as their own, though are actually not relatives. Due to former leniencies regarding family immigration, those attempting to enter the United States have been incentivized to cross as families, real or not, jeopardizing the lives of thousands of children. Since the program’s inception in April 2019, 238 fraudulent families have been identified, 329 false documents have been seized, 50 individuals have been identified who fraudulently claim to be UACs, and more than 350 individuals have been federally prosecuted.(178)

DNA Collection
In 2005, the DNA Fingerprint Act was passed, calling for the collection of DNA samples, including fingerprints and cheek swabs, for those taken into custody by law enforcement officers. The Department of Justice implemented the Act in 2009, though DHS received an exemption for non-criminal arrestees for one year in order to receive more time for its implementation.

This initial one-year extension was exploited and exhausted for the past decade, crippling CBP and ICE from being able to identify a potentially dangerous criminal among the nearly one million illegal aliens who have been detained and released. At the direction of President Trump, Attorney General Bar issued a Final Rule ordering DHS to collect DNA samples from detainees. Finally, our law enforcement officers had access to DNA sampling that enabled them to identify subjects, connect suspects to crimes, and eliminate criminal illegal aliens from our borders.

          B. Cooperation with Foreign Nations
President Trump also directed various agencies to work with foreign governments. Trump reduced our reliance on flimsy and hollow international immigration agreements, such as the Global Compact on Migration,(179) and instead took proactive steps to strengthen American policy and correct international expectations.

Trump discouraged illegal entry into the United States by removing incentives, loopholes, and free-rides in immigration policy. His administration also assisted our Central American neighbors in developing a prosperous, vibrant region where their people feel safe and optimistic creating futures in their own countries. Protecting Americans and their interests is the first priority of this Administration. However, discouraging individuals of any nation from risking their lives with nefarious smugglers and criminal organizations seeking to obtain illegal entry into the U.S. is also a victory that protects peoples everywhere.

In the latter half of 2019, a series of cooperative efforts were launched with the nations of the Northern Triangle – Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. These include Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACAs), Border Security Arrangements, and Biometric Data Sharing Program (BDSP) Arrangements.
In FY2019, over 72% of all apprehended migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border came from Northern Triangle countries.(180) ACAs were entered into with these countries, allowing migrants to seek protection in Central America, instead of the United States.(181) ACAs facilitate cooperation between the U.S. and host nation governments to enlarge humanitarian protections and return individuals to the Northern Triangle. The Biden-Harris Regime is dismantling these programs as well.

Biden’s decision harms the Border Security Agreements that facilitated institutional knowledge, training, and tactics to be shared with our foreign partners in assisting their own efforts to secure borders and resolve migratory challenges. ICE and CBP officials were deployed to tutor and aid host nation law enforcement officials in police, immigration, and border security forces.

Indeed, BDSP Arrangements significantly improved cooperation between Northern Triangle nations and DHS by proliferating information sharing and biometric data collection. As this crucial information is shared between partners, counterparts in both nations can better prevent and combat crime and resolve other threats to public and national security. Irregular migrant identities can more frequently and efficiently be identified and verified, enabling enhanced detection of wanted criminals, smugglers, and international criminal organizations. Another program known as Electronic Nationality Verification (ENV), enables repatriation of Central American migrants lacking fear claims to return to their countries of origin in a more expedited manner.(182)

Trump also invoked Section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), suspending issuance of visas to nations denying or unreasonably delaying repatriation of their citizens ordered to be removed from the United States.(183) “Visa sanctions” were imposed on Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone in 2017, Laos and Burma in 2018, Pakistan, Cuba, and Ghana in 2019.(184)

The Administration also maintained high levels of cooperation with Mexico to disrupt transnational criminal organizations, in turn disrupting human trafficking and smuggling efforts in the Americas and around the globe. During the pandemic, the two governments coordinated military and law enforcement personnel along the Southern Border to ensure the health and safety of both nations.  

Conclusion

This report provides a catalog and guidebook to the costs and consequences of illegal immigration into the United States. It should be clear from this report that the burden of illegal immigration falls heavily on American taxpayers, on American schoolchildren, the US healthcare system, and on those working poor citizens who are forced to compete with millions of illegal immigrants for decent jobs at decent wages.

This report also has demonstrates that the Secure Border policies of the Trump Administration made tremendous inroads into combating the problems associated with illegal immigration. If the President had won a second term – and given the widespread election irregularities fully documented in the Navarro Report, many people believe he did – the Trump policies, together with the President’s completed border wall, would have gone a long way toward ending America’s battle with an issue that continues to sharply divide the American people.

While the Democrat Party ostensibly represents the working poor and blue-collar laborers of America, this political party now advocates unrelentingly for open borders that will afflict maximum damage to these constituencies.

In all likelihood, the Democrat Party pushes for open borders in the belief that these illegal immigrants will eventually support the Democrat Party once afforded citizenship and vote for lasting Democratic control of both Congress and the White House. This calculus may well prove false as President Trump experienced some of his biggest improvements in vote totals among Blacks and Hispanics who have borne the brunt of the Democrat’s open border policies.

As the Biden-Harris Regime continues to dismantle the Secure Order policies of the Trump Administration, and as a crisis on our Southern border gains in intensity, it is well worth remembering that elections have consequences. On our Southern border, the very worst is yet to come – we must brace for the fallout.

Appendix A: Review of the Methodologies of Cost Estimates of Illegal Aliens
Studies of the costs illegal aliens may impose upon U.S. taxpayers and the broader U.S. economy and society exhibit a wide range of estimates. On the one hand, studies conducted or sponsored by advocates of open borders like the Cato Institute tend to minimize these costs – or claim net benefits.  On the other hand, studies conducted by organizations like Center for Immigration Studies and Federation for American Immigration Reform that support secure borders tend to estimate significant costs. However, it is more than just political leanings that may cause variations in the studies on the economic costs of illegal immigration. There are four main reasons academic studies vary on estimated costs: methodology, unit of measurement, inclusion or exclusion or anchor babies, and lack of readily available data. 

One reason variation occurs in literature reviews is the difference between top-down estimation methodology and bottom-up estimation approaches. The top-down approach is where the cost of a larger unit is divided down into smaller units to try and figure out the total cost (e.g. an apple pie must be divided by the cost of apples, sugar, and flour to get the cost of each ingredient). Conversely, the bottom-up approach is one that seeks to place on a cost on the smaller units to get to the total of the larger unit (e.g. the cost apples, plus sugar, plus flour equal the total cost of an apple pie).185 This becomes relevant when operating in an arena of billions of dollars and millions of people. The overall budgets have already been known, and were delineated in the annual appropriations bill. The challenge at hand is calculating how much illegal aliens consume of this budget, to the detriment of the American taxpayer. There are dozens of moving pieces to consider in these calculations: anchor babies versus illegal alien minors, legality versus practicality, short cutting systems, household versus individual costs, education levels, complexities in the immigration court system, just to name a few. Another methodological hurdle for the varying costs is the difference type of cost being used. Some institutions prefer to operate off of variable cost; others marginal costs or opportunity costs. The ways in which illegal aliens and the variables in place are valued and organized will impact how the information is interpreted and calculated.(186)

On an even simpler front, there is no standard of unit of measurement. Some studies prefer to analyze cost of household per year; other studies measure by the lump sum of all illegal aliens annually. These metrics are not easily convertible or comparable to each other. This can cause confusion and ambiguity about the cost per illegal alien, and illegal aliens at large. 

Consider the two tables below: Table Twelve shows the various estimate of household costs per year.  Table Thirteen shows the estimated total annual costs of illegal aliens collectively. 

 

Table Twelve only has three different sources, from three different years, and none of them have household expenditures for all the categories listed. Table 13 has four sources,188 from different years, with various elements predicted, using various methodologies.

Even numbers within the same chart may not be comparable because some studies include anchor babies in the cost of illegal aliens while others do not. Not only do these differences severely impact education costs. It also impacts the estimated welfare and medical costs as well.

Illegal aliens are prohibited from receiving means-tested federal public welfare benefits. However, if they are parents to an anchor baby, they can access many of these resources.(192)

For example, the Federation for American Immigration Reform has estimated that illegal immigration costs the U.S. taxpayer $116 billion annually.(193) The Heritage Foundation is more modest in its estimation of $54.5 billion annually.(194)

The Cato Institute, a Libertarian think tank, does not distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants and they conclude that immigrants as a whole net contribute $23.5 billion annually. However, even Cato acknowledges that illegal immigrants specifically net consume, although they do not share at what rate.
The pro-border security group FAIR includes anchor babies in its estimations. The open borders Cato institute excludes anchor babies from their estimations.(195)

One last challenge to estimating the costs of illegal aliens is the lack of available data. There are many contributing factors to this issue, most prominently, the presence of sanctuary regions and outdated or unspecific data. As previously discussed, many sanctuary cities/counties/states have made it illegal for government-funded institutions and employees to question the immigration status of any individual. This has made it difficult to acquire data on things like hospitalization rates, school enrollment rates, and welfare enrollment rates of illegal aliens. These policies have essentially made the option of calculating the fiscal impacts of illegal aliens difficult.

The other issue with acquiring good data is that many studies run years, and even decades, behind when the raw data was produced. For example, many think tanks use the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey to get their data, and set up a variety of parameters to predict which participant is an illegal alien or a legal immigrant, such as education level and English proficiency.(196) However, there is anywhere from a two to three year lag in the analyzing of this data, after the initial lag in documenting and organizing the raw data from the Census Bureau.(197) From the time of the survey being conducted to the time of a study being published, multiple years’ worth of illegal aliens have given birth, crossed the border, and committed crimes. Moreover, many analyses will make claims about the costs of arenas such as “crime” or “education,” but then fail to define what all falls into these arenas. This ambiguity makes estimations uncertain and wildly varying.

Take, for example, “crime.” Some institutions consider immigration court costs part of crime. Other organizations only consider criminal court within the “crime” category.(198)

Therefore, there are many challenges when predicting the expenses of illegal aliens, and there is also many challenges in analyzing already made estimates. Despite the many struggles to estimating the economic impacts of illegal immigration, and the wide array of methodologies, one thing is clear: illegal immigration costs the American taxpayer billions of dollars annually.

Endnotes
126 “What You Need to Know About Catch and Release,” The White House. 2 April 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/need-know-catch-release/
127 Graham Jr., Otis L., “A Vast Social Experiment: The Immigration Act of 1965,” NPG Forum. October 2005. https://npg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/socialexp.pdf
128 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “U.S. Citizen Petition for Other Relatives Inside of the United States,” 11 January 2019. https://my.uscis.gov/exploremyoptions/us_petition_for_other_family_members_inside_us
129 Qiu, Linda, “What Is ‘Chain Migration’? Here’s the Controversy Behind It,” The New York Times. 26 January 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/politics/the-facts-behind-the-weaponized-phrase-chain-migration.html
130 Between 2007 and 2017, 65.84% of all lawful permanent immigration to the U.S. has been family-based. This statistic was found by adding the total number family-sponsored and immediate relatives of U.S. citizen immigrants and dividing that by the total number of immigrants. All of these numbers were found in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s annual immigration statistics.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, “2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics” September 2008. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2007.pdf
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2017 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, “2017 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics” July 2019. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/yearbook_immigration_statistics_2017_0.pdf
131 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1964 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 1964. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32435066733346
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1968 Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 1968. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32435066733312
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1970 Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 1970. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000067698394
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1974 Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 1974. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32435066733254
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1978 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 1978. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015035350589?urlappend=%3Bseq=7
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1982 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” 1982. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924062350628
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1989 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” September 1990. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.l0055031603&view=1up&seq=72
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1997 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” October 1999. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1997.pdf
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” March 2002. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_1999.pdf
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, “2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics” September 2008. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2007.pdf
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, “2017 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,” July 2019. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/yearbook_immigration_statistics_2017_0.pdf
132 Gruwell, Abbie, “Unaccompanied Minors and the Flores Settlement Agreement: What to know.” National Conference of State Legislatures. 30 October 2018. http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/30/unaccompanied-minors-and-the-flores-settlement-agreement-what-to-know.aspx
133 Sussis, Matthew, “The History of the Flores Settlement,” Center for Immigration Studies. 11 February 2019. https://cis.org/Report/History-Flores-Settlement
134 Sussis, Matthew, “The History of the Flores Settlement,” Center for Immigration Studies. 11 February 2019. https://cis.org/Report/History-Flores-Settlement
135 “Flores v. Meese – Stipulated Settlement Agreement Plus Extension of Settlement.” American Civil Liberties Union. https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/flores-v-meese-stipulated-settlement-agreement-plus-extension-settlement
136 Nixon, Ron and Caitlin Dickerson, “Immigration Officials Taking New Steps to Discourage Smuggling of Children.” New York Times (Online). 24 September 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/us/politics/parents-illegal-immigrants-human-smuggling.html?partner=bloomberg
137 “TVPRA and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien Children,” Prepared Remarks of Senator Charles E. Grassley. 23 May 2018. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-23-18%20Grassley%20Statement.pdf
138 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Public Law No: 106-386. 28 October 2000. United States Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/3244
138 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed 10 September 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/328.html
140 U.D. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Questions and Answers: Victims of Human Trafficking, T Nonimmigrant Status,” Accessed on 10 September 2019. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status/questions-and-answers-victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status-0
141 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. Public Law No: 110-457. 23 December 2008. United States Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/7311
142 Kandel, William, “Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service. 18 January 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf
143 Feere, Jon, “2008 Trafficking Law Largely Inapplicable to Current Border Crisis,” Center for Immigration Studies. 16 July 2014. https://cis.org/2008-Trafficking-Law-Largely-Inapplicable-Current-Border-Crisis
144 “TVPRA and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien Children,” Prepared Remarks of Senator Charles E. Grassley. 23 May 2018. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-23-18%20Grassley%20Statement.pdf
145 Carcamo, Cindy, “U.S. must release child migrants held in family detention, court says,” Los Angeles Times. 6 July 2016. https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-migrant-children-20160706-snap-story.html
146 Jordan, Miriam, “Family Separation May Have Hit Thousands More Migrant Children Than Reported,” The New York Times. 17 January 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-trump-administration-migrants.html
Pelosi, Nancy, “Pelosi Statement on One Year Since President Trump’s Family Separation Policy,” 7 May 2019. https://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-on-one-year-since-president-trump-s-family-separation-policy
Hegarty, Aaron, “Timeline: Immigrant children separated from families at the border,” USA Today. 27 June 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/06/27/immigrant-children-family-separation-border- timeline/734014002/
Quinn, Melissa, “Mitt Romney on family separations at border: ‘We need a more compassionate answer’,” Washington Examiner. 18 June 2018. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/mitt-romney-on-family-separations-at-border-we-need-a-more-compassionate-answer
147 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Myth Vs. Fact: DHS Zero-Tolerance Policy,” 18 June 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/18/myth-vs-fact-dhs-zero-tolerance-policy
148 The 15% statistic was reported: Bolton, Alexander, “Homeland Security official describes widespread ‘fraudulent’ families at border,” The Hill. 11 June 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/447919-homeland-security-official-describes-widespread-fraudulent-families-at-border
In addition, from April to May 2019, 95 out of 562 families randomly interview were found to be fraudulent. Additionally, out of the 562 families interviewed, 176 documents or claims were discovered to be falsified.  According to DHS, ICE has distinguished about 275 fake families, 735 fraudulent documents or claims, and presented about 553 individuals for prosecution to DOJ from mid-April to June 2019.  Statistic taken from the transcript of a June 11, 2019 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Border Security. Acting Homeland Security Secretary Kevin McAleenan testified on the Southwest border which can be accessed through C-SPAN’s website: https://www.c-span.org/video/?461582-1/acting-dhs-secretary-kevin-mcaleenan-testifies-border-security
149 This was calculated by dividing Southwest border adult apprehensions by total apprehensions using year to date statistics, found at: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Migration FY2019,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration  
150 Numbers found from various CBP webpages by year: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Migration FY 2019,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Migration FY 2018,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2018
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Migration FY 2017,” https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration-fy2017
See also: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector FY07-FY18,” https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-
Mar/BP%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Citizenship%20FY07-FY18.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “United States Border Patrol: Total Family Unit* Apprehensions By Month, FY13-FY18,” https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-monthly-family-units-sector-fy13-fy18.pdf 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Custom and Border Protection, “United States Border Patrol Sector Profile, Juvenile and Adult Apprehensions, Apprehensions by Gender, Apprehensions / Seizure Statistics,”
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%202012%20Sect or%20Profile.pdf
151 Luckstead, Jeff, Stephen Devadoss and Abelardo Rodriguez, “The Effects of North American Free Trade Agreement and united States Farm Policies on Illegal Immigration and Agricultural Trade,” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 44(1). February 2012. https://tind-customer-agecon.s3.amazonaws.com/55b9d7f3-a79a-4f2e-8420-72cd6b8f29ee?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-
8%27%27jaae453.pdf&response-content-
type=application%2Fpdf&AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAXL7W7Q3XHXDVDQYS&Expires=1561738571&Signature= G5%2BK7kcNi2x7FHpBONvs4fuveVU%3D

152 Uchitelle, Louis, “Nafta Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?” The New York Times. 18 February 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18uchitelle.html
153 Uchitelle, Louis, “Nafta Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?” The New York Times. 18 February 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18uchitelle.html
154 “What Is A Maquiladora In Mexico?,” Manufacturing in Mexcio: Shelter Services in Mexico. https://manufacturinginmexico.org/maquiladora-in-mexico/
155 Wallace, Andrew, Matthew Kretman, and Scott Strogatz, “NAFTA Overview and Its Effect on Undocumented Immigration,” University of Michigan, http://www.umich.edu/~ac213/student_projects07/global/nafta.html
156 Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 678. Supreme Court of the United States. 27 June 2001. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/533/678/
157 “Immigration Enforcement: Better Data and Controls are Needed to Assure Consistency with the Supreme Court Decision on Long-Term Alien Detention,” U.S. General Accounting Office. 28 June 2004. https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242499.html
158 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/21/2017-08311/buy-american-and-hire-american
159 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “2nd Anniversary Buy American and Hire American Accomplishments,”https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/guides/OPA_BAHA_Accomplishments_Info graphic.pdf
160 U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Recognizing Anniversary of Buy American and Hire American Executive Order by Reaffirming its Commitment to Fight Discrimination Against U.S. Workers,” Office of Public Affairs, April 24, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recognizes-anniversary-buy-american-and-hire-american-executive-order
161 Ibid. See also: U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Settles Claim Against Maryland Construction Firm for Discriminating Against U.S. Workers,” Office of Public Affairs, March 19, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-claim-against-maryland-construction-firm-discriminating-against-us?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
162 “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States,” The White House, February 15, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/20/2019-03011/declaring-a-national-emergency-concerning-the-southern-border-of-the-united-states
163 “Emergency declaration at border was ‘unwarranted,’ Biden said. Thousands of troops remain there.,” The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/02/12/biden-border-mission/
164 “Presidential Memorandum on Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support of the National Vetting Enterprise,” The White House,  February 6, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-optimizing-use-federal-government-information-support-national-vetting-enterprise/
165 “Combating High Nonimmigrant Overstay Rates,” The White House, April 22, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/07/2019-09470/combating-high-nonimmigrant-overstay-rates
166 “President Donald J. Trump is Taking Action to Reduce Visa Overstays and Uphold the Rule of Law,” The White House, April 22, 2019. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-is-taking-action-to-reduce-visa-overstays-and-uphold-the-rule-of-law/
167 Hesson, Ted, “Trump suspends entry of certain foreign workers despite business opposition,” Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-workers/trump-suspends-entry-of-certain-foreign-workers-despite-business-opposition-idUSKBN23T2ZW
168 “Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Present a Risk to the United States Labor Market During the Economic Recovery Following the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Outbreak,” The White House, April 27, 2020. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/27/2020-09068/suspension-of-entry-of-immigrants-who-present-a-risk-to-the-united-states-labor-market-during-the
169 “Notice of Order Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries Where a Communicable Disease Exists,” The White House, March 20, 2020. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-03-26/pdf/2020-06327.pdf
170 “Proclamation Suspending Entry of Aliens Who Present a Risk to the U.S. Labor Market Following the Coronavirus Outbreak,” The White House, June 22, 2020. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspending-entry-immigrants-present-risk-u-s-labor-market-economic-recovery-following-covid-19-outbreak/
171 “Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census,”  July 23, 2020. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/23/2020-16216/excluding-illegal-aliens-from-the-apportionment-base-following-the-2020-census
172 “How Many Illegal Aliens Live in the United States?,” FAIR, February 19, 2021. https://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/how-many-illegal-aliens-united-states
173 “Immigration,” Carr Center For Human Rights Policy Harvard Kennedy School, https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/cchr/files/210201-immigration.pdf?m=1612490014
174 U.S. Department of Justice, “Matter of A-R-C-G-et al., Respondents,” 26 I&N Dec. 388. 26 August 2014. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/26/3811.pdf
175 “Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 16, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/16/2019-15246/asylum-eligibility-and-procedural-modifications
176 “Practice Advisory: Grave v. Whitaker,” American Civil Liberties Union. Center for Gender and Refugee Studies. 7 March 2019. https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/grace_practice_advisory_combined.pdf
177 “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, August 14, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/14/2019-17142/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-grounds
178 “ICE HSI El Paso, USBP identify more than 200 ‘fraudulent families’ in last 6 months,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, October 17, 2019.  https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-hsi-el-paso-usbp-identify-more-200-fraudulent-families-last-6-months
179 “Global compact for migration,” United Nations, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact
180 “Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements With Guatemala, Honduras, And El Salvador,”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_1028_opa_factsheet-northern-central-america-agreements_v2.pdf
181 “Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative Agreements Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, November 19, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/19/2019-25137/implementing-bilateral-and-multilateral-asylum-cooperative-agreements-under-the-immigration-and
182 “Acting Secretary McAleenan’s Prepared Remarks to the Council of Foreign Relations,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, September 23, 2019. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/09/23/acting-secretary-mcaleenans-prepared-remarks-council-foreign-relations#:~:text=In%20addition%2C%20DHS%20is%20expanding,by%20verifying%20their%20nationality%20el ectronically.
183 “Memorandum on Visa Sanctions.” The White House, April 10, 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-visa-sanctions/
184 “Repatriation of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://www.ice.gov/visasanctions
185 Hunt, Priscilla, James Anderson, and Jessica Saunders, “The Price of Justice: New National and State-Level Estimates of the Judicial and Legal Costs of Crime to Taxpayers,” Southern Criminal Justice Association, American Journal of Criminal Justice Volume 42. Pages 231-254.  
186 Hunt, Priscilla, James Anderson, and Jessica Saunders, “The Price of Justice: New National and State-Level Estimates of the Judicial and Legal Costs of Crime to Taxpayers,” Southern Criminal Justice Association, American Journal of Criminal Justice Volume 42. Pages 231-254.
187 O’Brien, Matt and Spencer Raley, “The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers,” Federation for American Immigration Reform, 27 September 2017. https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-united-states-taxpayers
Richwine, Jason and Robert Rector, “The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty to the U.S. Taxpayer,” The Heritage Foundation, 6 May 2013. https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer
Richwine, Jason, “The Cost of Welfare Use by Immigrant and Native Households,” Center for Immigration Studies, 9 May 2016. https://cis.org/Report/Cost-Welfare-Use-Immigrant-and-Native-Households
188 The Kaiser Family Foundation and RAND Corporation both had medical estimates as well, at $11.2 Billion and $1.1 Billion respectively.  
Kaiser Family Foundation Estimation:
Bowen Garrett et al., “The Coverage and Cost Impacts of Expanding Medicaid,” The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2009. https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/7901.pdf
RAND Corporation Estimation:
“RAND Study Shows Relatively Little Public Money Spent on Providing Health care to Undocumented Immigrants,” RAND Corporation. 14 November 2006. https://www.rand.org/news/press/2006/11/14.html
189 This calculation was found by taking Heritage Foundation’s illegal immigrant household average tax contribution multiplied by their estimated number of illegal alien-headed households. The report reads, “Assuming that the fiscal deficit for these unreported households was the same as the fiscal deficit for the unlawful immigrant households in the CPS, the total annual fiscal deficit (total benefits received minus total taxes paid) for all 3.79 million unlawful immigrant households together equaled $54.5 billion (the deficit of $14,387 per household times 3.79 million households). This sum includes direct and means-tested benefits, education, and population-based services.” The $14,387 value is the estimated deficit (consumption minus contribution). The estimated tax contribution is $10,344 per household. See, Richwine, Jason and Robert Rector, “The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty to the U.S. Taxpayer,” The Heritage Foundation, 6 May 2013. https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer
190 This number was not explicitly included within their studies. Their revisions to the FAIR estimation included an additional $11.2 billion in property taxes, $6.2 billion in social security and Medicare contributions, and $1.6 billion in sales tax revenues. See, Nowrasteh, Alex, “FAIR’s ‘Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration’ Study is Fatally Flawed,” CATO Institute, 29 September 2017. https://www.cato.org/blog/fairs-fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-study-fatally-flawed
191 For all FAIR estimates, see: O’Brien, Matt and Spencer Raley, “The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers,” Federation for American Immigration Reform, 27 September 2017. https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-united-states-taxpayers
For all Heritage Foundation estimates, see:
Richwine, Jason and Robert Rector, “The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty to the U.S. Taxpayer,” The Heritage Foundation, 6 May 2013. https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer
CATO Institute Education Cost Estimation:
Nowrasteh, Alex, “FAIR’s ‘Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration’ Study is Fatally Flawed,” CATO Institute, 29 September 2017. https://www.cato.org/blog/fairs-fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-study-fatally-flawed
CATO Institute Medical Expenditure Estimation:
Nowrasteh, Alex, “Illegal Immigrants—and other Non-Citizens—Should Not Receive Government Healthcare,” CATO Institute, 9 July 2019. https://www.cato.org/blog/illegal-immigrants-other-non-citizens-should-not-receive-government-healthcare
CATO Institute Crime Cost Estimation:
Landgrave, Michelangelo and Alex Nowrasteh, “Incarcerated Immigrants in 2016: Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin,” CATO Institute, 4 June 2018. https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/their-numbers-demographics-countries-origin
Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) Anchor Birth Estimation:
Camarota, Steven, Karen Zeigler, and Jason Richwine, “Births to Legal and Illegal Immigrants in the U.S.,” Center for Immigration Studies, 9 October 2018. https://cis.org/Report/Births-Legal-and-Illegal-Immigrants-US
CIS Medical Expenditure Estimation:
Edwards Jr., James, “The Medicaid Costs of Legalizing Illegal Aliens,” Center for Immigration Studies, 12 July 2010. https://cis.org/Medicaid-Costs-Legalizing-Illegal-Aliens
CIS Crime Cost Estimation:
Vaughan, Jessica, “GAO Updates Cost of Criminal Aliens,” Center for Immigration Studies, 23 April 2011. https://cis.org/Vaughan/GAO-Updates-Cost-Criminal-Aliens
192 “Aliens who are not qualified aliens ineligible for Federal public benefits,” 8 U.S.C. § 1611, United States Congress. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title8/chapter14&edition=prelim
For information regarding illegal aliens receiving benefits from their citizen children, see Endnotes 142, 143, 144, 166, 182, and 183.  
193 O’Brien, Matt and Spencer Raley, “The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers,” Federation for American Immigration Reform, 27 September 2017. https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-united-states-taxpayers
194 Richwine, Jason and Robert Rector, “The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty to the U.S. Taxpayer,” The Heritage Foundation, 6 May 2013. https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer
195 O’Brien, Matt and Spencer Raley, “The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers,” Federation for American Immigration Reform, 27 September 2017. https://www.fairus.org/issue/publications-resources/fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-united-states-taxpayers
Nowrasteh, Alex, “FAIR’s ‘Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration’ Study is Fatally Flawed,” CATO Institute, 29 September 2017. https://www.cato.org/blog/fairs-fiscal-burden-illegal-immigration-study-fatally-flawed
196 For examples, note the time of publishing and the date of data for the following sources:
Passel, Jeffrey and D’Vera Cohn, “U.S. unauthorized immigrants are more proficient in English, more educated than a decade ago,” Pew Research Center, 23 May 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/23/u-s-undocumented-immigrants-are-more-proficient-in-english-more-educated-than-a-decade-ago/
Hill, Laura, “English Proficiency of Immigrants,” Public Policy Institute of California, March 2011. https://www.ppic.org/publication/english-proficiency-of-immigrants/
Rosenblum, Marc and Ariel Ruiz Soto, “An Analysis of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States by Country and Region of Birth,” Migration Policy Institute, August 2015. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/analysis-unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-country-and-region-birth
197 For examples, see the methodology of the following:
Passel, Jeffrey and D’Vera Cohn, “U.S. unauthorized immigrants are more proficient in English, more educated than a decade ago,” Pew Research Center, 23 May 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/23/u-s-undocumented-immigrants-are-more-proficient-in-english-more-educated-than-a-decade-ago/
Hill, Laura, “English Proficiency of Immigrants,” Public Policy Institute of California, March 2011. https://www.ppic.org/publication/english-proficiency-of-immigrants/
Rosenblum, Marc and Ariel Ruiz Soto, “An Analysis of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States by Country and Region of Birth,” Migration Policy Institute, August 2015. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/analysis-unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-country-and-region-birth
198 Federation for American Immigration Reform considers border and immigration enforcement a part of criminal justice, however, they separate the costs of immigration crime and other crimes.  
Obrien, Matthew, Spencer Raley, and Jack Martin, “The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers (2017),” Federation for American Immigration Reform, 2017. https://www.fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/Fiscal-Burden-of-Illegal-Immigration-2017.pdf
CATO Institute does not consider immigration related arrests a part of the criminal justice expenditure of illegal aliens.
Landgrave, Michelangelo and Alex Nowrasteh, “Incarcerated Immigrants in 2016: Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin,” CATO Institute, 4 June 2018. https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/their-numbers-demographics-countries-origin
For more information on illegal aliens in the criminal justice system, see: Clark, Rebecca and Scott Anderson, “Illegal Aliens in Federal, State, and Local Criminal Justice Systems,” The Urban Institute. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/62771/410366-Illegal-Aliens-in-Federal-State-and-Local-Criminal-Justice-Systems.PDF